When (re)designing a work environment, tasks or functions are allocated more or less explicitly among humans and between humans and machines. After a brief review and discussion of issues related to task allocation, we argue that an important aspect to be addressed when (re)designing socio-technical systems is the systematic evaluation of the impact of allocation decisions on the overall reliability of such systems. It is contended that the cooperative dimension of such systems is one of the main elements that contribute to this reliability. This claim leads us to present a conceptual framework for modelling the human contribution to the overall reliability of complex cooperative work systems. The framework is characterized here as a set of notions, mainly regulation and shared context, used to discuss and reason about this role of humans in the error tolerance properties of such systems. These notions are demonstrated with di!erent examples derived from empirical studies of work practices in two complex cooperative work settings (air tra$c and nuclear reactor control). We then show how this conceptual framework can be used for the evaluation of allocation decisions and more generally to inform design.
Introduction
In the human factors literature, function or task allocation usually refers to the process of &&formally'' distributing functions or tasks among di!erent &&agents'', particularly between humans and machines, and is thus generally considered an important and integral part of the design of work settings. The focus on allocating tasks between humans and machines, especially computer systems, is essentially related to an increasing endeavour to automate parts of human contribution in complex work settings. This is partly due to a belief that the appropriate technology is now available. This endeavour has led engineers and human factors specialists to seek general principles and criteria for &&scienti"cally'' allocating tasks between human and machines. This e!ort is not new. For example, Fitts (1951 , cited in Sheridan, 1997 proposed to allocate functions between humans and machines on the basis of a table that describes the strong and weak features of humans and machines. However, this kind of approach to function allocation has been largely criticized (Sheridan, 1997) for two reasons.
First, it appears that seeking general principles for allocating tasks is de"nitely an unrealistic approach because the allocation process is situation-dependent and essentially heuristic.
Second, this approach is static and ignores important characteristics of work activities (e.g. dynamism, context dependency and so on). Indeed, as shown in a number of empirical studies, work is often accomplished through a dynamic redistribution of tasks or roles, involving interactions between individuals, in a cooperative, opportunistic and situated way (e.g. Hutchins, 1995) . It has also been shown that people's activities do not mirror a strict division of work (Hughes, Randall & Shapiro, 1992; Hutchins, 1995; . Futhermore, there are cases where actually performed work contradicts prescribed work (McCarthy, Healey, Wright & Harrison 1997) . In other words, as clearly stated by Healey and McCarthy (1997) , work &&resists the kind of de"nitive decomposition that conventional models of function allocation adopt' ' (p. 41) . This kind of resistance to functional decomposition is also a feature of artifacts, in the sense that they can be interpreted and utilized in di!erent ways. It is then misleading to analyse work activities and technical resources only in terms of prescribed tasks, functions and #ow of information. Similarly, the francophone ergonomic approach emphasizes the fact that the activity of individuals is never identical to the tasks prescribed by the organization (Leplat, 1994; de Montmollin, 1991) . In this approach, the term task refers to the work that people were requested or supposed to accomplish and the conditions (technical, organizational, social, economical, etc.) in which this accomplishment takes place. The activity refers to how people actually perform the prescribed work. In other words, activity refers to actual work practices.
This quest for general principles of task allocation implies another important problem: the issue of how to analyse the consequences of allocation decisions on the whole system is underestimated. Similarly, Dekker and Wright (1997) point out that assessing the repercussions of allocation decisions is as important as wondering which tasks to attribute to humans and to machines.
One of the important repercussions of allocation decisions is related to the cooperative nature of complex work settings and the error-tolerance capabilities of such systems. Indeed, the cooperative nature of work appears to contribute to the overall reliability of complex socio-technical systems, that is, their robustness against local agents' errors (de Terssac & Chabaud, 1990; Jones, 1995; Rognin, 1996; Bressolle Decortis, Pavard & Salembier, 1996; Rognin & Bannon, 1997; Rognin et al. 1998) . In other words, cooperation seems to help to ensure the reliability and dependability of such complex systems.
The contribution of cooperation to the overall reliability of complex work systems is the starting point of the study presented here. We argue that it is important to assess systematically the potential consequences, not only of allocation decisions, but also of decisions about the whole design on the contribution of cooperation to complex work systems dependability. Indeed, the assessment of such consequences is critical to errortolerant design, especially in the context of safety-critical work systems (e.g. nuclear power plants, air tra$c control and aviation) in which errors can result in a threat to the safety of people and to the environment. Therefore, redesigning such work systems 358 requires us to predict the potential impact of changes in order to enhance, or at least retain the systems error-resistance properties. However, making such predictions requires not only a deep understanding and acurate model of the cooperative processes, but also a methodology allowing us to systematically assess the potential consequences of allocation decisions.
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the design of complex work systems by presenting an approach and a conceptual framework for assessing and foreseeing the repercussions of design decisions on the error-tolerance properties of complex work systems. We start with reviewing brie#y the historical evolution of human reliability assessment, underlining the passage from quantitative to qualitative analysis, and the current need for considering its cooperative dimension. In Section 3, we present our conceptual framework, which we illustrate in section 4, with examples issued from "eld studies in two complex work systems (air tra$c control, nuclear process control). In Section 5, we discuss the issue of taking into account the role of the cooperative nature of work, and propose an approach for assessing the consequences of design decisions on the reliability of such systems.
A cooperative approach to the reliability of complex work systems
In complex work situations, ensuring reliability is one of the major concerns. Sociotechnical reliability went through various evolutions during the last decades, "rst focusing on the technical components, then evolving from quantitative to qualitative approaches, later on from a negative to a positive vision of the role of human agents, and at last from individual to organizational level of analysis.
FROM QUANTITATIVE TO QUALITATIVE APPROACHES OF RELIABILITY
Numerous frameworks and models are currently used to perform the analysis of human reliability. Di!erences are noticed at many levels, in terms of objectives, features and consequences of applying these models (Gerdes, 1993) . Objectives can be as diverse as identify (errors occurrence, error propagation, underlying causes), quantify (number of errors, consequences, seriousness of errors) or reduce errors. Features refer to the criteria used when describing and analysing situations.
Between 1950 and 1970, human reliability was "rst approached by analogy with technical reliability. The human agent was considered as a component, whose probability of failure had to be measured. Human reliability, de"ned as the &&probability that an agent accomplishes successfully his mission under "xed time and "xed conditions'' (Rook, 1962) was then assessed using probabilistic and ordinal methods, such as THERP (Swain, 1964) . This particular method rests on the implementation of the following "ve steps.
(1) De"ne bottlenecks/weakness of the system. (2) List and analyse tasks. (3) Assess probability of error of each task. (4) Assess the impact of human error on the system. (5) Modify the system and reassess the probability of failure.
In such an approach, focused on risk management, the human agent was mainly seen as a potential source of error. The objectives were to quantify the risks of failures, rather than understand the underlying causes.
Since 1980, cognitive ergonomics has o!ered a new framework for the analysis of human reliability. Studies in this discipline are oriented towards the analysis of cognitive processes (perception, memory, mental representations, problem solving and so on). In this context, analyses tend to describe the emergence of errors, pointing out the succession and combination of events. People no longer consider human error per se, but are more interested in whole systems composed of &&technico-organizational'' components in interaction with human agents (Kasbi, 1995) .
Human reliability is now de"ned as the &&opportunity for agents to reach explicit and implicit goals within acceptable limits'' (De Terssac & Chabaud, 1990) . The interesting point here is the evolution from the idea of probability of failure to the notion of opportunity to succeed, the environmental conditions being integrated as a major factor in reliability. The analysis focuses on understanding the errors by trying to locate them at di!erent levels of cognitive processes.
This qualitative approach is composed of two trends, one proposing a categorization of errors, the other suggesting supports for their prevention. The "rst trend, descriptive and analytical, does not aim at reducing errors. It rather aims at providing tools supporting error collection and analysis. The second trend, is based on mental models of agents, used not only used to describe errors and predict their occurrence, but also to identify their consequences.
Various models, classi"cations and methods are proposed (Norman, 1981; Rouse & Rouse, 1983; Leplat, 1985; Rasmussen, Duncan & Leplat 1987; Reason 1987 Reason , 1990 . Methods emerge in order to describe problem solving situations, identify phases in information processing (acquisition, diagnosis, planning, action and validation) and explain mechanisms under the error production (Rasmussen et al. 1987) .
Once again, similarities between technical and human engineering are observed. Similar concepts are developed both in software engineering and in human factors. Even though terms such as fault are sometimes problematic (especially in human factors, where it has a pejorative connotation), researchers tend to apply similar concepts when analysing and classifying errors. If we consider, for example, Laprie et al. (1996) , we notice that both communities speak about the same attributes, describe similar means and use similar classi"cations.
Attributes such as safety, security, reliability and availability can be characterized for both technical components and human beings. For example, the attribute availability, de"ned as the readiness to be used at any moment, can refer to safety systems, as well as to people whose attention and availability has to be ensured at very speci"c periods (for example in terms of prioritizing tasks in speci"c contexts). Hollnagel's classi"cation (1991) , in the context of man}machine interaction, suggests combining various means. Analogies can be pointed out for each point, if we consider concepts developed in Laprie et al. (1996) .
-They use the notion of micro-incidents to illustrate this idea that these incidents are too benign to directly a!ect the functioning of the system, and are generally recovered by the agents.
* Designing a new system or withdrawing part of the system are strongly related to the notions of veri"cation and validation.
So, in terms of means both communities suggest the combination of prevention and tolerance. Prevention refers to the avoidance of faults, which ensured (for example) in the case of technical components through the application of de"ned design methods, and in the case of people through training and procedures. The tolerance, following the three steps of detection, diagnosis and recovery, can be ensured similarly by people and by technical systems. What brought the two communities together can be related to the acceptance that errors are unavoidable events. Their occurrence, at a certain stage during the operational life of the socio-technical systems, is a fact and no longer an assumption. Therefore, fault-tolerant systems have to be designed. The homogeneity and consistency in the functioning of various components requires designers to use similar concepts.
Similarly in both communities, various researches oriented towards the understanding of the emergence of errors and the associated underpinning mechanisms (e.g. in the human factors community, Norman, 1983; Rasmussen, 1986 ) brought static models, not very operational, but essential to understand human information processing.
Most of these retrospective approaches analyse a posteriori the course of events and underline factors contributing to the emergence of errors. A generic model focusing on the emergence of accidents is still missing. However, we observe a great need for understanding and modelling the processes of degradation. Studies in cognitive engineering, for example, analyse nominal situations, in which incidents occur (see, for example, Bressolle et al. 1996) . Incidents,-less serious than accidents, refer to a situation di!erent from the expected one, but still not leading to failure at the systemic level.
The underlying assumption is that systems can function despite the presence of incidents. What prevents the system from failing is the application of mechanisms (either technical or human) regulating the situation. Understanding for example how people recover errors in communication (through detailed analysis of verbal interactions) highlights various elements people take into account while engaged in cooperation. This approach follows two objectives; "rst, analyse in nominal situations how degradation occurs (increased load, annoyances) and second, identify how people deal with this progressive degradation.
These studies are strongly in#uenced by a positive vision of reliability, and more speci"cally of the human contribution.
FROM A NEGATIVE TO A POSITIVE VISION OF RELIABILITY
As we brie#y suggested in the previous section, reliability focused originally not on the reliable and strong dimension of systems, but on their fallible, weak and untrustworthy nature.
Both technical and human &&components'' were assessed in terms of potential failures and the probability of failure evaluated (both in terms of quantity and quality). Actually, the word reliability itself was interpreted as unreliability: people were not interested in measuring the operators' rates of success and the related trust one could place in them, but rather their rate of failure, that is their non-reliability.
Even though studies in the early 1970s (Faverge, 1970) underlined the dual nature of people, seen as &&agents of reliability and unreliability'', it took a few more years to seriously consider and analyse the positive dimension of reliability. In this context, we distinguish two sides, the educational role of errors at an individual level and the dependable nature of people at a more global level.
The "rst interesting role played by errors is the fact that people learn from their errors (Seifert & Hutchins, 1992; Amalberti, 1996) as well as test assumptions (the famous trial and error strategy). This learning role of errors is both individual and collective. Not only does one learn from his/her own error, but one's error also bene"ts every team member, either when people share their experience, or when they attribute competencies and weaknesses to their colleagues. The knowledge that people acquire also their colleagues' knowledge will be used later on, either to identify who might be of any help, or whose actions have to be carefully monitored (and errors implicitly expected). In a way, we can say that committing an error once (and not hiding it) contributes to reliability in the sense that it makes others attentive to your own actions. It implies the emergence of loops of control and redundancies between colleagues. Of course, this mechanism can also be implemented by people to control the functioning of some systems perceived as fallible.
This comment leads us to mention works highlighting how human agents directly ensure systems dependability by detecting and handling errors (De Terssac & Chabaud, 1990; Leplat, 1997; . People are no longer seen as sources of error, due to their limited capabilities, both in terms of cognitive and physical limitations. Despite these limitations in certain situations, people are still superior to machines due to their adaptability. In other words, while machines are e$cient in expected situations (applying e$ciently safely, "xed and appropriate procedures), people are best when confronted with unexpected events. Then, they are able to use their past experiences (conducting analogies between situations) and to take risks, for example in trying forbidden (but known as safe) actions. This argument favours keeping the humans in the loop. Despite their weakness and unreliability in certain contexts, humans still ensure the dependability of systems.
COLLECTIVE DIMENSION OF RELIABILITY
Most of the approaches presented above focused on the reliability of single agents, while it now appears that the collective dimension of work has to be taken into account. The evolution from technical systems to human components, from quantitative to qualitative aspects of reliability and from a negative to positive de"nition of reliability should now be followed by the integration of the collective and social dimension of work (Leplat, 1994) . The unit of analysis has therefore to be extended in the sense that the unit is now the whole system, composed of people and artefacts. Cognitive-based approaches should now be complemented with organizational-based ones, such as the one proposed by McCarthy et al. (1997) .
Cooperation, either reduced to punctual interactions supporting problem solving, or extended to long-term projects, is essential for any work organization. Indeed, it may be 362 argued that cooperative activities are a crucial part of e!ective decision making, problem identi"cation and problem solving in complex work settings. As noted by Schmidt (1994) , cooperation ful"ls di!erent important functions: augmentation of physical and cognitive capacities (a cooperative ensemble has more capacities than an individual), combination of di!erent specialties and mutual critical assessment (cooperation may allow the application of multiple problem-solving strategies or heuristics, which ensure the decision making process).
Cooperation among various actors is also necessary when tasks have to be distributed, more or less explicitly and formally. Actually, the working conditions imposed by the organization usually take into account neither all the reality of work, nor the existence of real-time constraints. In order to deal with these unexpected features, people at work develop informal organization and cooperative mechanisms. However, this remains possible only as long as the working environment does not restrict such an adaptation, allowing #exibility and providing enough margins of autonomy (De Terssac 1992) .
Thus, as illustrated in Morvan et al. (1996) , cooperation at work enables people to reshape their tasks contents in order to ful"l e$ciently the mission they are allocated. Mechanisms such as information sharing, mutual knowledge, and mutual awareness support directly this reallocation of functions among people. These mechanisms are described later in this paper.
Finally, cooperation also plays an important role in the global reliability of sociotechnical systems. In many complex systems (nuclear power plant, control room), this reliability strongly depends both on the e$ciency of collective decision making and on the appropriateness of the real-time tasks allocation (Rognin, 1996) . The design of safety-critical systems requires a deep understanding of human cooperation, in order to identify how it contributes to the overall dependability. Designers are facing a dilemma regarding the human role and more speci"cally the collective role in the global reliability. A trade-o! has now to be found between e$cient human mechanisms and their weakness in speci"c situations.
The present paper is part of the trend considering the positive contribution of people to systems dependability. It proposes to model human contribution to reliability, insisting speci"cally on the role played by redundancies primarily in information sharing resources supports, and secondarily in support for control and action. As illustrated later with examples, the collective dimension of work has a central role in this reliability. In accordance with McCarthy et al. (1997) who suggest an organizational approach of errors in high consequences systems, we do focus on the collaborative aspects of work.
From a reliability perspective, we identify as one of the main factors the possibility for people to control and regulate each other's contributions. We propose an approach of cooperative processes of regulation in terms of loops. This approach is used to analyse collaborative mechanisms observed in real work settings. In the next section, we de"ne and illustrate basic concepts related to these so-called collective regulation loops. leads to a modi"cation of the input I.
Modes of regulation in dynamic complex work settings
-This de"nition is especially relevant in the context of this paper, in the sense that it is less restrictive than other de"nitions such as the one proposed by Piaget for example (Piaget, 1967) . It is therefore compatible with the two main regulation mechanisms we are addressing here, namely negative feedback and injection of information.
? According to the nature of the system, convenience will be synonymous of safe or productive. (Krippendorf, 1986 ).-In dynamic process supervision for example, the controllers' goal is to act in order to maintain the process in a convenient? state.
The regulation can be of a functional or structural nature. One of the most obvious mechanisms in functional regulation is negative feedback, which consists of reducing the error or deviation from a goal state. The process of reduction is based on comparing what is desired or expected with the value of what is observed (see Figure 1 ). In the domain of aeronautical navigation for example, pilots have to repeat instructions given by air tra$c controllers. If we consider the Figure 1 , O represents the repeated instruction, while R is the instruction given by the controllers. A di!erence between the two instructions will lead to a reaction from the controllers (and sometimes from other pilots overhearing the communication), aiming to rectify the error or clarify a misunderstanding. This regulation is based on a formal rule, which stipulates that instructions must be acknowledged. This rule allows the implementation of negative feedback in the sense that it gives the possibility of detecting misinterpretations. Note that this type of regulation may also be based on informal actions, that is, actions not guided by any explicitly prescribed rule.
Structural regulation is a mode of regulation, which can take the following two forms.
* A regulation where properties of the sub-parts of the system are modi"ed in order to adapt better its behaviour to external perturbations (e.g. increased tra$c load, unexpected event, non-desired evolution of a parameter of the system) and internal perturbations (e.g. failure or loss of functional response of a sub-part of the system).
In the context of work activities these regulation mechanisms can either take the form of organizational shifts or the adaptation of cognitive strategies (Sperandio, 1977; Leplat, 1994) . Structural regulation often appears to be an e$cient way to overcome di$culties that functional regulation on its own cannot solve. In air tra$c control for example, when controllers have to face an outburst of tra$c, a sector of the airspace can be split into two sub-sectors, in order to (theoretically) divide the work load and subsequently maintain the system in an acceptably safe state.
* A regulation seen as the consequence of multiple non-controlled interactions between the di!erent parts of the system. Contrary to functional regulation, structural regulation of this kind can be implemented via positive feedback. In some cases, these 364 FIGURE 2. Homeostatic system regulated by positive interactions betwen sub-parts of the system (oscillators). Each sub-part sends one another a signal. These interactions enable the system to synchronize and generate a structurally stable global signal (the suppression of an oscillator does not perturb signi"cantly the behaviour of the system) (from Bressolle et al., 1996) .
interactions may lead to system instability (Larsen e!ect in acoustics), but in other cases they ensure the structural stability of the system (Figure 2 ). In complex work settings, this concept can be metaphorically applied to describe and explain some properties of error-resistant systems. Indeed, the system is organized in such a way that an access to information (concerning other agents' behaviour and/or state of the environment) is potentially provided to each agent. This ensures that, to a certain extent, any agent in the system is replaceable and that any failure or mistake that occurs somewhere in the system can be potentially detected and repaired somewhere else.
In the context of situated work activities, a relevant distinction can be introduced between formal and informal regulation. &&Formal'' regulations refer to those based on formalized operating procedures (for example read-back procedure in air tra$c control which de"nes the format of interactions between controllers and pilots). However, even if these regulations can provide an important resource for ensuring work systems reliability and/or performance, they are not su$cient. Other regulation mechanisms play a crucial role even though they are more di$cult to identify; these regulations can be de"ned as &&informal'' or &&emergent'' regulations in the sense that they are not prescribed and emerge from the local interactions between agents. In other words, they are not based on explicit and deterministic rules or procedures, but result from contingent or situated behaviours. In this paper, we will focus primarily on the second type of regulation mechanisms.
We suggest that the global reliability of socio-technical systems relies on the implementation of both functional and structural regulation (either formal or informal), allowing anticipative and corrective actions to be performed in cooperative work environments.
In the remainder of this section, we successively introduce concepts used later in the paper. These are the modes of regulation, the shared context and related features of communication and mutual visibility in shared environments. 
MODES OF REGULATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION
From our point of view, one mechanism which ensures the functional stability of socio-technical systems can be referred to as the distribution or injection of informational features in the system (Bressolle et al., 1996) . In work settings, injected information, which is sometimes considered as &&super#uous'' when transmitted, may appear as very relevant later in the interaction. Distributed information contributes to updating the current state of the collective situation awareness. Another function ensured by this distribution of information is the checking and validation of information. Disseminated and propagated data reinforce one another and participate in the coherence and reliability of the individual actions. The distributed information constitutes the building blocks of shared context and is therefore a base for e!ective regulation mechanisms (functional and structural) which ensure the global reliability of the system (Figure 3) .
In other words, it appears that operators often distribute information that may be captured and used by other agents in di!erent situations. For example, consider the following:
* An information distributed intentionally to identi"ed agents may be used later for other purposes.
* An information distributed intentionally to identi"ed agents may be used by other agents; the latter having captured the information without the awareness of the agent who transmitted the information.
* An action (non-verbal and verbal) performed by an agent, without the intention of rendering it publicly visible, may be informationally relevant for other agents.
Note that the distribution of information in complex work systems has two consequences in terms of trajectories or propagation of information in the system. From an analyst's viewpoint, it is di$cult, even impossible, to determine in advance the actual pathways of information, in terms of the analysis of work practice (Hutchins & Klausen, 1996) . However, based on an accurate knowledge of the work situation, it is possible to 366 determine possible pathways, and afterwards, it is often possible to establish the actual trajectory followed by information. Indeed, when analyzing people's activities and communication along a temporal frame, one can identify when a speci"c body of information once made available, is used on by people. This gives observers assumptions about the actual pathways. One e$cient way to validate these assumptions is then to ask people to describe their activities and focus on the available and used information. Yet, it is also di$cult for operators to determine the trajectories of information they deliver intentionally. This can have di!erent consequences for them: they can neither adapt the information to the potential receivers, nor foresee how the information may be used and so on.
SHARED CONTEXT AND REGULATION LOOPS
The various studies we have been conducting focused on human activities in collaborative environments. Whether cooperation was proximal (co-located agents) or distant, people shared multiple resources as diverse as artifacts (control panels, radar screen and paper documents) and colleagues (communications, verbal reactions and movements). The assumption our work rests on is the role of shared contextual information on socio-technical reliability. As we aim to demonstrate in this paper, shared context is a core phenomena that contributes to system reliability in the sense that it allows the emergence of regulation loops. Shared context refers to contextual information that is potentially shared by operators and that might be or is relevant in di!erent ways. This notion of shared context is based on the concept of Mutual Cognitive Environment (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) which refers to facts that are mutually manifest to a collection of agents. An information or a fact is mutually manifest when it can be perceived or infered by each individual. We emphasize the notion of potentiality, since people's perception and cognitive processes can hardly be determined with certainty. Indeed, it is often di$cult to determine with certainty how operators interpret events. Consequently, we can only assume the meaning attributed to a same event by multiple agents who perceived that event. Note that as de"ned here shared context does not refer to mutual knowledge or beliefs: people not only share knowledge and beliefs, but they also know that they are shared. There is a notion of reciprocity in the concept. This notion of shared context is somewhat related to the notion of &&team situation awareness'' (Salas et al., 1995) which refers to the awareness that a group of agents has of a situation.
There are di!erent means by which shared context may be developed and maintained: communication, mutual visibility of activites and shared resources. These means will di!er according to external (type of co-presence, type of communication) and internal (perceptual and inferential capabilities of agents) conditions. The injection of information contributes also to the elaboration and updating of a shared context via communication. information is accessible to A and B: A says s, s means i, the meaning of s is shared, and so on (Figure 4) .
When focusing on intentional communication, the development and updating of shared context are supported by various modes, such as mono-addressed or multiaddressed communications. Mono-addressed communicative acts refer to communications intentionally addressed to an identi"ed listener and coming from an identi"ed speaker. Multi-addressed communication occurs when communicative acts are addressed intentionally to multiple agents. One of our studies (Pavard, et al., 1993) stresses the use and e$ciency of multi-addressed messages supported by audio communications network in a space mission control centre. Various sub-networks provide information to identi"ed specialists, according to sub-systems they are controlling. While each person can belong to more than one sub-network, the information on each network is very speci"c. In a way, information is disseminated on the basis of its relevance for these specialists. Multi-addressing reduces individual workload both for the addresser and the addresee: Firstly, one sends only once a message which is then distributed to various addressees, and Secondly only messages considered as potentially relevant to the listeners are exchanged. Yet, people receive very specialized and local information, and might lose a certain awareness of the global context. People miss peripheral information, sometimes considered punctually useless, but eventually relating to future activity.
A third mode is broadcasted messages. This refers for example to verbal messages exchanged within a shared room, available to every person present in the room. Sometimes speakers may neither be aware of the identity of all the addressees, nor of their interest in the information. In these situations, it becomes the listeners' task to identify if the communicative act is relevant to their own activities. A study of cooperation within a control room emphasized the importance of broadcast between collocated agents and its contribution to socio-technical reliability (Rognin & Pavard, 1996) , in the sense that it supports awareness, which itself enables people to detect and recover errors. Yet, broadcasted information also introduces a certain amount of uncertainty as it strongly rests, on the one hand on assumptions related to the listeners' abilities as well as availability, and on the other hand, to close collaboration and mutual understanding among team members. 
MUTUAL VISIBILITY OF ACTIVITIES
In the context of work, people can, intentionally or not, look at and/or listen to each other's actions, when they are performed, or through traces they left in the environment. People's actions are thus accessible and considered as being publicly available to others. The real or virtual co-presence of agents (in the sense of mediated by artifacts such as videoconferencing screens for example) allows peripheral modes of perception such as overhearing and overseeing (Heath & Lu!, 1992) . This mutual visibility of each other's activities allows agents to potentially share information about the performed actions and then to be mutually aware of their activities (Schmidt, 1994) . Hutchins and Klausen (1996) accounted for this phenomenon in terms of distribution of access to information. For example, in an analysis of the activities performed in a airplane cockpit, these authors highlight the importance of the fact that the "rst o$cer (F/O) can hear the captain's radio transmission. This access to the radio transmission is important because it allows the F/O to attend to and monitor the activities of the captain. As noted by Heath and Lu! (1992) in a study of work activities in a control room in the London Underground, overhearing and overseeing processes operate not only through a passive mode but also through an active one; this refers to the fact that sometimes agents render their own actions publicly accessible.
RESOURCE SHARING
When shared, artifacts such as displays, papers and computer-based systems may support the sharing of information that can be gathered from these resources. Here, sharing refers to the physical and cognitive use of artifacts by a group of agents at a given time. &&Physical'' refers to the manipulation of objects, while &&cognitive'' is taken in the sense of allowing the construction of information. In the domain of air tra$c control for example, the sharing of the radar screen enables the controllers to share a lot of information (e.g. the state of the airspace, the aircraft). However, the access to the same informational resources does not ensure shared interpretations or meanings that may be constructed on the basis of these resources.
In the next section, we present examples, which highlight the contribution of cooperation to reliability through various and numerous mechanisms, such as monitoring and information distribution. As we will show, these mechanisms depend on and support the maintaining and updating of a shared context.
Examples of efficient regulation loops

EXAMPLE 1: AIR-TRAFFIC CONTROL
This "rst example is taken from a real air tra$c control situation. Air tra$c is usually controlled by teams consisting of two air tra$c controllers: a Tactical Controller (TC) and a planning controller (PC), who are co-located. These controllers perform their work in workspaces which are speci"c physical environments equipped with the following basic tools: radar screens, telephone and radiotelephone facilities and racks for #ight progress strips. The radar screen present in two dimensions aircraft in the sector (a small part of the airspace) with some additional information (#ight number, current speed, -In this situation, the INI and COOR controllers have respectively the same functions as the TC and PC controllers in en-route control situation. level of each aircraft). The telephone is used to communicate with other controllers, the radiotelephone to communicate with pilots. Strips are small cards, which include information about #ights (e.g. callsign, #ight level, planned #ight path). The TC monitors the current tra$c on the radar and is incharge of communications with the pilots. He/she is also in charge of handling the strips on which he/she annotates instructions given to pilots, and organizes them to present information about #ights (e.g. location, destination) and particular aspects of the tra$c (e.g. con#ict between #ights, abnormal aircraft). The principal role of the planning controller (PC) is to take charge of the communications with planning controllers from adjacent sectors (Table 1) .
In this example drawn from observations performed in an approach control situation, the INI noticed that the COOR-has assigned the same expected approach time (EAT) to two #ights, on the corresponding strips. Given that two #ights cannot be assigned the same EAT, the INI draws the attention of the COOR to the problem. As shown in Figure  5 , if we use the analogy with control theory, we can say that the INI performed a comparison between an implicit expectation (two EAT cannot be identical) and what has been written on the strip by the COOR. Then the COOR recti"ed the mistake by writing on the strips and talking to the INI. In this example, the detection and the recovery of the error were not ensured by the same agent. The process of detection was enabled by the shared access to strips.
EXAMPLE 2: AIR-TRAFFIC CONTROL
The following example illustrates structural regulation in the sense that it demonstrates a shift in task allocation (the structure). Two teams of controllers are involved: the &&TB team'' (in particular, the PC) and the &&TE team''. As we mentioned above (see the "rst example), the PC is responsible for handling communications and coordination with adjacent sectors. In this example, the PC-TB attempts to inform the TC-TE about a certain heading given to the #ight Charlie Sierra. In doing so, he tries to prevent (or to avoid) the occurrence of a potential coordination problem. However, at the beginning of the interaction, the PC-TE picked up the receiver to take a call. Thus, he was not able to take in the other interaction initiated by the PC-TB. The TC-TE noticed this fact, and takes charge of the interaction with the PC-TB. In other words, he carried out one of the responsibilities of the PC-TE. This regulative process could emerge because the TC-TE -These letters refers to the sectors handled by each team. Note that these teams are located in the same control room. Thus they can talk to each other face to face. In order to reduce the reader's load, we will call PC-TE and TC-TE the PC and TC of the E team, and the PC-TB the PC from the B team.
has access not only to the activities of the PC-TE, but also to actions performed by the other teams located in the shared control room (see Table 2 ).-
EXAMPLE 3: NUCLEAR REACTOR CONTROL
Two agents (a supervisor and a reactor controller) are located in the centralized control room, while a third agent (a mechanic) is operating a valve somewhere in the plant. The co-located agents are in front of the control panel, observing the evolution of parameters informing the e$ciency and the consequences of the actions in progress. The opening of the valve for example should lead to an increase of the #ow. Let us represent the actions and communications taking place ( Figure 6 ). The mechanic is opening a valve (arrow 1). The information presented on the control panel does not evolve according to the supervisor's expectations, as no modi"cation is observed. As the information observed by the supervisor and the controller do not correspond to the expected ones (arrow 2), the supervisor "rst discusses with the controller to identity what could be happening. When discussing with the controller, the supervisor elaborates a hypothesis (wrong valve opened) and mentions the fact that this has happened before. Another hypothesis is related to problems with the controlcommand system (in other words the information presented does not correspond to what is actually happening). In order to test the "rst hypothesis, the supervisor calls the mechanic (arrow 3). Calling the mechanic enables them to assess the correctness of action in progress and thus validate the elaborated hypothesis.
What enables the supervisor to identify the problem is the fact that not only can he observe parameters and infer related actions, but he also has knowledge and expectations related to the consequences of the actions. Because this knowledge and access are shared among the persons within the control room, the assumption can "rst be discussed (and therefore tested) before its evaluation when calling the mechanic.
The existence of a body of shared knowledge between agents (about expected reactions and possible erroneous actions) as well as shared resources (control panel, communication supports) contributes to the detection of early errors and allows them to be recovered before the occurrence of serious failures.
SYNTHESIS
These three examples allows us to underline the importance of cooperation, regulation mechanisms and shared context in the error-tolerant properties of complex work settings. The sharing of a physical environment, as well as &&informal'' mechanisms such as overseeing and overhearing are supported by the public nature of activities and artefacts. These mechanisms dynamically ensure the development and the updating of the shared context. They also help agents to monitor mutually their activities, thus contributing to the detection of potential errors. Finally they enable other mechanisms such as control and vaidation to appear, facilitating the emergence of regulation mechanisms. Note that the organizational factors (e.g. hierarchical or authoritative relationships between agents) can play an important role in the e$ciency of these regulations. For example, these mechanisms have less chance to emerge in &&deferential contexts' , which refer to situations in which there is a tendency to be reluctant to contest the authority "gure. Then our contention is that the e$ciency of 372 FIGURE 7. Regulative loops in human cooperation.
corrective regulations depends on the possibility for agents to &challenge'' and discuss the actions and decisions of the others.
In terms of regulation mechanisms, a general representation can be proposed (Figure 7 ). This schema allows us to describe the agents, the explicit actions and results. Yet, it still requires underlying mechanisms (mutual and peripheral awareness) to be represented. Although this representation has to be improved, in order to account for the collective nature of regulations, as well as for their temporal and dynamical features, it can be used as a basis to analyse and ultimately model the relation between reliability and cooperative activities.
Impact on function allocation and design
As we attempted to show through the examples presented above, the cooperative nature of complex work systems can contribute to their error tolerance properties in enabling the detection and the recovery of agents' errors by others. Through the analysis of these examples, we suggest that reliability be, at least in part, based on regulation loops which operates through shared context. This leads us to underline the crucial role of people in the system. We highlighted that shared context rests on the possibility for agents to perceive and attend to the activities of other participants. In other words, the distribution of access to others' activities plays a crucial role in the development of shared context and the emergence of regulation loops. We have also argued that shared artifacts constitute an important basis for the development of shared context. It is important to note that we do not claim that the error resistance properties of complex socio-technical systems depend only on regulation loops that operate through shared context. Now, what are the possible implications of the approach and the conceptual framework presented here for function allocation and more generally for design?
In the introduction, we discussed several problems related to the topic of allocation of functions. One of them was the lack of concern for the consequences of allocation decisions. In other words people who look for general principles neglect the issue of the potential consequences of allocation decisions. Indeed, as noted by di!erent authors (e.g. Dekker & Wright, 1997; Hollnagel & Bye, 1997; Beevis & Essens, 1997) , it is important to consider how operators' actual or future work and the properties (especially performance and reliability) of socio-technical systems can be a!ected by changes in task allocation. Thus, instead of focusing mainly on how to distribute tasks between the di!erent components of systems or on which automation strategies one must adopt, one should also focus explicitly on the analysis of the e!ects of changes in task allocation and how to assess these e!ects. This point is essential for redesigning e!ective and error-resistant complex work systems.
Numerous approaches have been proposed to evaluate the consequences of tasks or function allocation decisions. For example, from a functional modelling perspective, Hollnagel and Blye (1997) suggest the issue of how much information about &&automation activity'' is necessary for operators to sustain their understanding of the current situation. In other words, it is proposed to evaluate the impact of automating tasks on the level of information provided by the system to the operators. In order to evaluate di!erent cases of task allocation, they propose using a tasks analysis method (the GoalsMeans Task Analysis) which describes the work system (operators and automation) in terms of tasks and goals. Beevis and Essens (1997) report di!erent criteria that have been used or recommended for the evaluation of the implications of function allocation decisions: task performance measurement, operator workload, operator responsibility, team and system e!ectiveness, system operability, usability, maintainability.
However, these approaches have limits. The reliability and performance properties of complex socio-technical systems are evaluated in terms of task allocation, without reference to other important characteristics of work environments. For example, these approaches do not take into account the role of cooperation, artifacts and spatial organization of the environment. As shown by numerous studies of work activity, these characteristics play an important role in the reliability and e$ciency of complex work systems (Heath & Lu!, 1991; Hutchins, 1995; Filippi & Theureau, 1995; Hutchins & Klausen 1996; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1996) . Thus, in ignoring these characteristics, these approaches lead to &&decontextualized'' evaluations of the repercussions of task allocation decisions; indeed, they are used as if there were no interactions between task allocation and the features of work environments. Our contention is that with respect to the evaluation of such repercussions, it is essential to take into account these characteristics of work situations.
Our analysis of the contribution of cooperation to complex work systems dependability, in terms of regulation loops and shared context proposes a framework for assessing the potential e!ects of changes in task allocation. More generally, this framework provides information on the impact of (re)design (introduction of new technology, organizational modi"cations, etc.) on work and consequently, on the error tolerance properties of systems. One of the major properties of our framework is to take into account di!erent characteristics of work environments.
In accordance with the approach and the conceptual framework outlined in this paper, aiming to evaluate the e!ects of task allocation decision on operator's work (and on the system reliability), we suggest assessing the implications of these decisions on the shared context (de"ned earlier as contextual information potentially shared by agents). The underlying assumption is that allocation decisions associated with (re)design may have consequences on work activities and therefore on the error resistance properties of the work system in which the agents are situated (Figure 8 ). The other important assumption is that by enabling the emergence of &&corrective'' regulation loops, contextual information sharing, which here refers to information about the situation (e.g. state of the process at a given time, agents' actions), contributes to and maintains the reliability of complex socio-technical systems.
Several steps are required in order to evaluate the consequences of design decisions on shared context. These steps are part of a methodological framework developed by di!erent researchers of the GRIC laboratory in order to assess systematically the potential impact of the redesign of complex work systems on information sharing (Zorola, Pavard & Bastide, 1995; Salembier, Zorola-Villarreal & Kuiper, 1995; Salembier & Zouinar, 1999) .
In the case of a modi"ed work situation, the "rst step consists of describing and analyzing the processes by which shared context is developed and maintained between agents in the on going situation. It requires a detailed analysis of the real activities of agents in the &&natural'' work setting or in a simulated one, with a particular focus on the cooperative nature of work and on the role of artifacts, communication and mutual visibility in the development and maintenance of shared context. The analysis must consider not only nominal situations but also di.cult ones (e.g. high workload, incidents). Such situations are essential because it is well known that they may change the behaviours of operators. They can, for example, change their cognitive strategies and modify the way they use the artifacts (Benchekroun et al., 1994) . The analysis must also permit us to identify the regulation loops/mechanisms that contribute to the error tolerance properties of the system. Here, the focus is on the interactions between the operators and the role of the structure of the environment in which people are embedded (artifacts, spatial location of agents, etc.).
Then it is possible to evaluate design decisions by analysing how shared context can be developed and maintained in each case. The results obtained in each situation must be compared with the current situation, in order to identify the changes induced by design decisions in relation to shared context. More speci"cally, the method consists of determining the set of relevant contextual information shared in the current work situation and in the modi"ed situations. For the evaluation process, the shared context (i.e. the set of relevant contextual information) determined in the current situation is compared with the shared contexts identi"ed in the future situations. It should be possible by then, to see in detail if the possibilities of sharing contextual information are improved or reduced by each design decision, in comparison with the existing situation. As design is often an iterative process, the results obtained through this kind of evaluation may be used for de"ning and assessing other new work environments and cases of task allocation. Thus, this conceptual and methodological framework could help designers and human factors specialists to assess di!erent design decisions and consequently di!erent cases of task allocation from the shared context perspective.
This methodological framework has been used for the evaluation of di!erent automation scenarios in the domain of air tra$c control : Salembier, Kahn, Zorola, Villarreal & Zouinar, 1997 . The aim of the evaluation was to analyse the potential impact of di!erent new organizations of work including new technology and new ways of performing tasks (Data Link, air-ground integration) on the cooperative aspect of air tra$c controller's work. This impact has been assessed through the analysis of the consequences of di!erent design schemes for shared context.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to suggest that the impact of allocation of functions on current activities should be carefully and systematically studied, in order to either preserve or enhance the e$ciency of the cooperative processes involved in people coordination and in overall socio-technical reliability. We argued that allocation of function should be de"ned with the objectives of supporting formal and informal regulation mechanisms, especially those related to the maintenance of reliability. To address this issue, we have used a conceptual framework that focuses on the notions of shared context and regulation loops. In this model shared context is seen as playing a fundamental role in allowing the emergence of regulation mechanisms through communication artefacts sharing and mutual access to activities.
Within the context of this model, the work situation is seen as composed of multiple actors, multiple activities and interactions which take place in a social and material environment. This point leads us to highlight the fact that function allocation requires the whole work situation to be taken into account.
In the context of the (re)organization of complex work systems, we claimed that it would be useful to be able to predict the consequences induced by the (re)design on the distribution of information and consequently shared context. However, this attempt is by no means complete and requires further development, for example a more formal integration of the notion of &&regulation loop''.
As future work, we also intend to use the approach sketched here to analyse situations where regulations mechanisms are ine$cient, in order to understand why sometimes these mechanisms do not operate.
